← Back to Catalog

Excessive Agency

A condition in which an AI system is granted or exercises capabilities, permissions, autonomous decision-making authority, or ability to affect external systems beyond what is necessary for a task and its risks.

Example

A system asked only to present options also has permission to transmit information externally without first obtaining the user's confirmation.

Distinctions and cautions

AI Agent describes a system that may interact with tools and its environment across multiple steps. Excessive Agency asks whether the scope of permissions or external effects exceeds what is needed. It differs from Goal Misalignment and Unsafe Compliance, and does not describe the model as a person with human-like intentions.

Terminology note

Whether an AI system’s functionality, permissions, or scope of autonomous action is excessive depends on the task, risks, permission design, and operating environment.

Evidence

View evidence →

LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency

Title
LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency
Author / organization
OWASP
Year
2025
Source type / publication status
Institutional security guidance; living/current
Supported concepts / claim context
Excessive Agency; functionality, permissions, autonomy and mitigations.
Scope and limitations
Security-framework terminology; not an ISO/JIS or universal terminology standard.
Access / version note
Living guidance; exact page URL not recorded.
Recorded official URL / DOI / identifier
As recorded: NOT_RECORDED_IN_RESEARCH_INPUT (official OWASP page) (no URL inferred)

Agentic AI

Title
Agentic AI
Author / organization
NIST
Year
2026
Source type / publication status
Government official web; current
Supported concepts / claim context
AI Agent; autonomy and goal-driven interaction.
Scope and limitations
A high-level official description, not a universally binding implementation standard.
Access / version note
Official page referenced in the research input; exact link not recorded.
Recorded official URL / DOI / identifier
As recorded: NOT_RECORDED_IN_RESEARCH_INPUT (official NIST page) (no URL inferred)

Strengthening AI Agent Hijacking Evaluations

Title
Strengthening AI Agent Hijacking Evaluations
Author / organization
NIST CAISI
Year
2025
Source type / publication status
Government primary evaluation / official blog; current
Supported concepts / claim context
Indirect Prompt Injection; agent hijacking.
Scope and limitations
AgentDojo simulated environments; findings are simulation-scoped.
Access / version note
Official page referenced; exact URL not recorded.
Recorded official URL / DOI / identifier
As recorded: NOT_RECORDED_IN_RESEARCH_INPUT (official NIST page) (no URL inferred)