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Prompt Injection

A problem in which instructions embedded in untrusted input disrupt the instruction or control boundaries that a model or system is intended to follow.

Example

Input contains instructions that conflict with the user's actual task, and the model prioritizes those instructions instead of the intended operation.

Distinctions and cautions

Prompt Injection is the broader problem of disrupting instruction and control boundaries through untrusted input. This differs from Prompt Sensitivity, which concerns changes in results following small, meaning-preserving variations in prompt wording, rather than adversarial redirection of control. If the result also involves assistance beyond applicable safety constraints, that outcome may be recorded separately as Unsafe Compliance.

Evidence

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AI 100-2e2025 Adversarial Machine Learning

Title
AI 100-2e2025 Adversarial Machine Learning
Author / organization
Vassilev et al.; NIST
Year
2025
Source type / publication status
Government official technical publication; published
Supported concepts / claim context
Prompt Injection, direct/indirect variants, jailbreak boundary.
Scope and limitations
Cybersecurity taxonomy, not the AI Reliability Catalog ontology.
Access / version note
Published official source.
Recorded official URL / DOI / identifier
DOI: 10.6028/NIST.AI.100-2e2025 (DOI resolver)

Transferable Direct Prompt Injection via Activation-Guided MCMC Sampling

Title
Transferable Direct Prompt Injection via Activation-Guided MCMC Sampling
Author / organization
Li et al.
Year
2025
Source type / publication status
EMNLP peer-reviewed research; published
Supported concepts / claim context
Direct Prompt Injection; adversarial attack construction.
Scope and limitations
Attack success rates depend on the tested models and scenarios.
Access / version note
Published EMNLP; exact DOI not recorded.
Recorded official URL / DOI / identifier
As recorded: NOT_RECORDED_IN_RESEARCH_INPUT (ACL Anthology; exact DOI not surfaced) (no URL inferred)

PIGuard

Title
PIGuard
Author / organization
Li et al.
Year
2025
Source type / publication status
ACL peer-reviewed research; published
Supported concepts / claim context
Prompt Injection guardrails and overdefense limits.
Scope and limitations
Performance of detectors/guardrails; not complete attack defense.
Access / version note
Published ACL.
Recorded official URL / DOI / identifier
DOI: 10.18653/v1/2025.acl-long.1468 (DOI resolver)